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Elements of a History of the Soul in North-West Semitic Texts 
npš/nbš in the Hebrew Bible and the Katumuwa Inscription 
 
1. Introduction 
Amongst Hebrew Bible scholars of a variety of languages and traditions – and not just 
amongst those who take a special interest in social anthropology and its uses for the 
understanding of ancient Northwest-Semitic texts and artefacts – the question of the 
understanding of biblical key terms and concepts pertaining to the human condition has 
attracted a fair amount of interest.1 Amongst those key terms and concepts it is the concept of 
nefeš that has proved to be particularly attractive and challenging. Probably the main reason 
for that is the perennial interest taken in concepts of the “soul” in the Western philosophical 
and theological traditions. Recent decades have seen a shift of emphasis in the interpretation 
of nefeš, and many exegetes have claimed that the theological anthropology of the biblical 
authors excluded concepts of the soul as a material or immaterial entity distinct from the 
human body. That shift has had an effect on contemporary Bible translations and revisions in 
both the Jewish and Christian traditions. If, for example, we compare the ways in which the 
                                                 
1 Cf., amongst many others, B. Janowski, “Die lebendige næfæš: Das Alte Testament und die 
Frage nach der ‘Seele’”, in: idem, Der nahe und der ferne Gott: Beiträge zur Theologie 
des Alten Testaments 5 (Neukirchen-Vluyn, 2014,  pp. 73-116; S. Niditch, The Responsive 
Self: Personal Religion in Biblical Literature of the Neo-Babylonian and Persian Periods 
(The Anchor Yale Bible Reference Library; New Haven  and London, 2015), and A. 
Schellenberg, Der Mensch, das Bild Gottes?: Zum Gedanken einer Sonderstellung des 
Menschen im Alten Testament und in weiteren altorientalischen Quellen (Abhandlungen 
zur Theologie des Alten und Neuen Testaments 101; Zürich, 2011). 
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instances of nefeš in Ezek. 18:4 are rendered in the Revised Standard Version and in the New 
Revised Standard Version respectively, there is an interesting observation to make. The 
Hebrew Text reads as follows:  
יא ָתֽמּות׃ ִ֥ את ה  ֵ֖ ָנה ַהֶנִ֥פֶ ׁש ַהֹחט  ֵ֑ י־ה  ן ל  ֵ֖ ֶנִֶ֥פׁש ַהב  ב ּוכְּ ֶנֶֶ֧פׁש ָהָאָ֛ ָנה כְּ י ה ֵ֔ ִ֣ ָפׁשֹו֙ת ל  ן ָכל־ַהנְּ ֵ֤   ה 
The RSV has: “Behold, all souls are mine; the soul of the father as well as the soul of the son 
is mine: the soul that sins shall die.” In the New Revised Standard Version, we read: “Know 
that all lives are mine; the life of the parent as well as the life of the child is mine: it is only 
the person who sins that shall die.” The New JPS Tanakh gives the following rendering: 
“Consider, all lives are Mine; the life of the parent and the life of the child are both Mine. 
The person who sins, only he shall die.”  
The reluctance to translate nefeš as “soul” is palpable and most probably a result of the 
exegetical discussions of the term in the wake of the contributions of Johannes Pedersen, 
Hans Walter Wolff and others.2 The scholars who produced the New Revised Standard 
Version, as well as the translators of the New JPS Tanakh, obviously thought that the choice 
of “soul” in earlier translations had been inappropriate. Both groups of translators chose two 
English terms to render one and the same Hebrew term, which is a problematic decision at 
the best of times, and they tied themselves into knots: with regard to the last instance of nefeš 
in the verse, they realised that “life” would have been a nonsensical choice and went for 
“person” instead: the need for a rendering such as “person” or “soul” really is indeed 
inescapable here.  
                                                 
2 Cf. especially J. Pedersen, Israel, its Life and Culture, 4 vols. in 2 (London and 
Copenhagen, 1926-1940, and H. W. Wolff, Anthropologie des Alten Testaments (Munich, 
1973); new edition: H. W. Wolff, Anthropologie des Alten Testaments: Mit zwei Anhängen 
neu herausgegeben von Bernd Janowski (Gütersloh, 2010). 
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The exegetical trend that informs the two versions has been going hand in hand with the 
reasoning of Jewish and Christian scholars of religion and theologians who profess to have a 
deeper understanding of biblical concepts of personal eschatology than their predecessors in 
times past. By contrast, some philosophers and theologians have tried to revisit, re-evaluate 
and revive traditional views. However, in the study of biblical and other North-West Semitic 
literatures, too, there have been dissident voices – that is, voices that do not chime in with the 
chorus of those who deny that the Hebrew term nefeš displays any traces of the concept of the 
human soul as an entity that is in some sense distinct from the body. The discussions between 
both camps has often tended to focus on some of the biblical psalms, and Psalms 16 and 49 
have been at the centre of one of the debates.  
I will need to go into a bit more detail regarding the exegetical discussion among biblical 
scholars, especially with a view to the psalms, and to the wider philosophical and theological 
context in which it is taking place. The exegetical and theological debate around the term 
nefeš and the conceptualization of the term with regard to views of the soul and the person 
has been particularly lively in German-language scholarship. There are those who argue for a 
(for want of a better term) monistic understanding of the human person and assume that the 
nefeš was considered to be inseparable from the body and would perish together with it. This 
is the view held, and argued in great detail, by – amongst others – Johannes Pedersen, Hans 
Walter Wolff, Christoph Barth and Bernd Janowski.3 Oswald Loretz turned against such 
interpretations of nefeš in his compendious essay on Psalm 16 in which he advocates the 
understanding of nefeš, in Psalm 16, as “soul”. Loretz provides a very detailed analysis of 
                                                 
3 See the works mentioned in n. 2 as well as Janowski, “Die lebendige næfæš”. 
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Psalm 16 and its use of nefeš and interacts with the opposing view, rightly devoting much 
space to the parallel debates in philosophy and theology.4  
Ulrich Barth, a philosopher of religion on whose work Loretz partly relies, regrets that 
what he calls “archaizing and eliminative interpretations”5 of the relevant texts in the Hebrew 
Bible make it impossible adequately to understand the true complexity of the 
conceptualization of nefeš in the Hebrew Bible. In Barth’s view, this may be due to a present-
day abhorrence of a certain type of supposedly Platonizing interpretations of the Hebrew 
Bible and the New Testament that are perceived to lead exegetes astray.6 Much could be said 
about the motives behind this resistance against allegedly Platonizing interpretations, which 
often remain unconscious, but this is not the place for it. Let us instead focus on the need to 
return to the biblical texts, to take their North-West Semitic setting seriously, and not to 
                                                 
4 See O. Loretz, “Die postmortale (himmlische) Theoxenie der npš “Seele, Totenseele” in 
ugaritisch-biblischer Sicht nach Psalm 16,10-11: Die Ablösung der ugaritisch-
kanaanäischen rāpi’ūma/Rōphe’ȋm/Rephaȋm durch npš “Seele (eines Toten), Totengeist” 
im Judentum”, Ugarit-Forschungen 38 (2006), pp. 445-497. 
5 U. Barth, “Selbstbewußtsein und Seele”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 101 (2004), 
(pp. 198-217) p. 199: “in archaisierenden oder eliminativen Deutungen”. 
6 Barth, “Selbstbewußtsein und Seele”, p. 199. On the problem of the soul in modern 
Systematic Theology, cf. also K. Huxel, Ontologie des seelischen Lebens: Ein Beitrag zur 
theologischen Anthropologie im Anschluß an Hume, Kant, Schleiermacher und Dilthey 
(Religion in Philosophy and Theology 15; Tübingen, 2004) and eadem, Unsterblichkeit der 
Seele versus Ganztodthese? – Ein Grundproblem christlicher Eschatologie in ökumenischer 
Perspektive, NZSTh 48 (2006), pp. 341-366. 
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dismiss exegetical approaches out of hand simply because they are perceived to be either 
“archaizing and eliminative” or Platonizing and ahistorical.  
What, then, do those who think that the concept of the “soul” can be found in the Hebrew 
Bible mean when they speak of the soul? Is it possible that their view is not simply an 
anachronistic, Platonizing aberration in the interpretation of the Hebrew Bible? First of all, 
we need to take on board that having a concept of the soul does not necessarily entail an 
endorsement of the dualistic Platonic conception of the soul, as expressed in Plato’s Phaedo 
(79e-80b). There, Plato’s Socrates describes the soul, while it is still joined to the body, as the 
ruling force and the body as the subordinate servant.7 Socrates’ conversation-partner then 
concludes: “The soul resembles the divine and the body the mortal.” And from that follows, 
according to Socrates, [80b] “that the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and immortal, 
and intelligible, and uniform, and indissoluble, and unchangeable; and the body is in the very 
likeness of the human, and mortal, and unintelligible, and multiform, and dissoluble, and 
changeable”.8 
It is the Platonic understanding of the soul that colours all talk about the soul to this day. 
Yet it is a fact that other concepts of the soul existed in the Mediterranean and the Near East 
in antiquity – idealist ones, like Plato’s, and materialist ones, like those promoted by the 
Stoics. Of course we will not find a Platonic understanding of the soul in the Hebrew Bible, 
                                                 
7 ὅρα δὴ καὶ τῇδε ὅτι ἐπειδὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦσι ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι 
ἡ φύσις προστάττει, τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν: 
“When the soul and the body are united, then nature orders the soul to rule and govern, and 
the body to obey and serve” (ET: B. Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato translated into English 
with Analyses and Introductions, vol. II,  third edition (Oxford and London, 1892), p. 222). 
8 Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, vol. II, p. 223. 
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but that does not necessarily mean that concepts of the soul generally are absent from the 
Hebrew Bible, as J. Pedersen and others have claimed.9  
Important parts of the ongoing debate about anthropological terms and concepts in the 
Hebrew Bible took place before the Katamuwa stele was found and its inscription published. 
Since its publication, the discussion among scholars of North-West Semitic philology and 
biblical scholars has very much focused on the stele and its inscription in the immediate 
North-West Semitic linguistic and archaeological contexts. By contrast, I should like to focus 
on biblical texts that, in my view, conceptualize nefeš as “soul” or “person”: after exploring 
the use of the cognate term in the Katumuwa inscription, I should like to apply the insights 
thus won to some biblical texts of key importance. As we shall see, the inscription, in the 
context of the stele overall and its cultic use, lends considerable support to one of the two 
opposing views of nefeš in the Bible expressed in the recent exegetical, theological and 
philosophical debates. 
The Katumuwa stele was discovered in Zincirli in Anatolia by the Neubauer expedition 
on 21 July 2008 and, amongst many other things, throws new light on the meaning and uses 
of *napš and its cognates in North-West Semitic and other Semitic literatures. From the point 
of view of Hebrew Bible scholarship, this is significant because the conceptualization of nbš 
(the Aramaic term in the inscription, which is the cognate of Hebrew nefeš) adds a new 
dimension to the quest for the correct interpretation of nefeš in the Hebrew Bible. Therefore I 
will discuss the text and image found on the Katumuwa stele, but I shall not explore them for 
their own sake. Rather, I shall interpret them with the aim of using them as a key to a more 
subtle and differentiated understanding of the term nefeš in the Hebrew Bible. 
                                                 
9 Cf. Pedersen, Israel, vol. 1, pp. 99-181. 
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The lead questions for the purposes of the present paper will therefore be: 1) what does 
the Katumuwa stele say and show with regard to the supposed location and characteristics of 
the nbš as well as the ritual context and function of the stele itself? 2) Do biblical texts that 
employ the term nefeš, and do other ancient Near Eastern texts and artefacts, betray concepts 
that are cognate with the understanding of nbš informing the Katumuwa stele? 3) What light, 
if any, does the Katumuwa stele throw on the interpretation of the concept of nefeš in the 
Hebrew Bible? 
 
2.The supposed location and characteristics of the nbš according to the Katumuwa stele’s 
inscription and iconography and the ritual context and function of the stele 
 
On the basis of archaeological, palaeographic and philological considerations the stele can be 
confidently dated to the time of the reign of Panamuwa II.10 After it was initially thought that 
the inscription was written in Sam’alian, Pardee thinks – rightly, in my view – that it does not 
have a sufficient number of differential characteristics to make it anything but an example of 
a “previously unattested dialect of Aramaic”.11 
                                                 
10 D. Pardee, “The Katumuwa Inscription”, in: V. R. Herrmann, V. R. and J. D. Schloen 
(eds.), In Remembrance of me: Feasting with the Dead in the Ancient Middle East 
(Oriental Institute Museum Publications 37; Chicago, 2014), (pp. 45-48) p. 46:  The 
reference to Panamuwa refers “to the later of the two well-known kings of Sam’al who 
bore that name” and reigned from 743/740 to 733/732 BCE. 
11 D. Pardee, “A New Aramaic Inscription from Zincirli”, BASOR 356 (2009), (pp. 51–71) 
pp. 52-53. 
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This is the transcription offered by Pardee in his editio princeps:12 
 
1.ʼnk . ktmw . ‘bd ┌.┐ pnmw . ┌zy┐ . qnt . l┌y┐ . nṣb . b  
2. ḥyy . wšmt . wth . bsyr/d . ʻlmy . wḥggt . s 
3. yr/d . zn . šwr . lhdd . qr/dpd/rl . wybl . lng  
4. d/r . ṣwd/rn .wybl . lšmš . wybl . lhdd . krmn  
5. wybl . lkbbw . wybl . lnbšy . zy . bnṣb . zn .  
6. wʻt . mn . mn . bny . ʼw . 
7. mn bny ʼš . wyhy . lh . 
8. nsyr/d . znn . wlw yqḥ . mn  
9. ḥyl . krm .znn . šʼ.  
10. ywmn . lywmn . wyh  
11. rg . bnbšy 
12. wyšwy 
13. ly . šq  
 
My translation, which uses Pardee’s as its basis but differs from it with regard to a number of 
points,13 reads as follows:  
  
1. I am Katumuwa, servant of Panamuwa, who commissioned for myself (this) stele while 
2. [still] living. I placed it in my eternal [assembly-]chamber and [ritually] established 
(ḥgg/ḥwg) 
                                                 
12 Pardee, “A New Aramaic Inscription”, p. 53. 
13 Cf. Pardee, “A New Aramaic Inscription”, pp. 53-54. 
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3. this [assembly-]chamber [by sacrificing] a bull for Hadad QR/DPD/RL, a ram for NGD/R 
4. SWD/RN, a ram for Šamš, a ram for Hadad of the Vineyards, 
5. a ram for Kubaba, and a ram for my soul which is in this stele.  
6. Henceforth, whoever of my sons or 
7. of the sons of anybody [else] should come into possession of 
8. this chamber, let him take from 
9. the best of this vine[yard] [as] an offering 
10. year after year. He shall also [ritually]  
11. slaughter for my soul 
12. and apportion 
13. for me a leg-cut.  
 
Let us first explore the way in which a channel of communication is established between the 
stele and the ancient readers of its inscription in the stele’s ritual context.  
The first remarkable fact is that the reader is being addressed by a disembodied first-person 
speaker: “I am Katumuwa”. The Phoenician and Punic form of the 1st ps. sg. c. pronoun, ʼnh3, 
here occurs in an Aramaic text; cf. KAI 214:1 and KAI 215:19 where the personal pronoun 
ʼnk occurs in Aramaic texts instead of the ’nh one would expect.14 The disembodied “I” of 
the inscription is equated with Katumuwa’s nbš, which is, of course, the Aramaic 
actualization of the original Semitic *napš, found in Hebrew as nefeš and in Arabic as nafs. 
The underlying idea is that of Katumuwa’s nbš speaking from the stele, through the medium 
of the inscription. Thus, in a sense, the “I” is not disembodied at all. It speaks from the stele, 
                                                 
14 Cf. the editors’ comment in KAI, vol. II, p. 216: “אנך: pron. pers. abs. der 1. P. c. sg. 
Kanaanäisch!” 
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which has been its abode ever since the event of Katumuwa’s physical death. The fact that 
Katumuwa has physically died is implicitly conveyed when the inscription tells us that he 
commissioned the stele “while [still] living” (bḥyy, l. 1-2). The reader is then informed that 
Katumuwa owns an “eternal [assembly-]chamber” – I am here reading syd, with Sanders15  – 
which he had had ritually established (wḥggt). The verb in question here is ḥgg, used in the 
pa‘‘el or D-stem, as has been pointed out by Pardee.16 The verb, thus used in the causative 
and factitive sense, signifies the act of establishing the chamber (syd) as a place of ritual. This 
must be the correct reading: while there is a problem with the precise identification of dālet 
and rēš respectively in the Aramaic monumental script used at the stele’s time of origin, syd 
makes sense as an actualization of the root s-w-d, as discussed by Sanders.17 The ritual of 
dedication clearly entails the sacrifice of a bull and four rams. The last of the rams in each 
celebration is to be offered “for my soul which is in this stele” (wybl . lnbšy . zy . bnṣb . zn; l. 
5); zy here “introducing [a] relative subordinate clause”.18  
                                                 
15 Pardee, “A New Aramaic Inscription”, p. 60, reads syr and tentatively reconstructs this as 
meaning “chamber”. 
16 Pardee, “A New Aramaic Inscription”, p. 60-61. 
17 S. L. Sanders, “The Appetites of the Dead: West Semitic Linguistic and Ritual Aspects of 
the Katumuwa Stele”, BASOR 369 (2013), (pp. 35-55) pp. 38-40. Sanders accepts the 
derivation of syd from s-w-d on the basis of Epigraphic South Arabian evidence proposed by 
G. Mazzini, “On the Problematic Term syr/d in the New Old Aramaic Inscription from 
Zincirli”, Ugarit-Forschungen 41 (2009), pp. 505-507.  
18 J. Hoftijzer and K. Jongeling, Dictionary of the North-West Semitic Inscriptions, vol. 1 
(Leiden/New York/Cologne, 1993), p. 310. 
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The inscription consists of two parts which “are joined conceptually by the appearance of the 
word nbš [nabsh] “soul” near the end of each section (lines 5 and 11), each time explicitly 
associated with the sacrifice of an animal, and by the explicit stipulation of how the ‘eternal’ 
chamber is to be maintained as such”.19 The original dedicatory ritual thus established a 
recurring sacrificial ritual that was supposed to take place “year by year” (l. 10: ywmn 
lywmn). The ritual slaughter – the verb hrg is used – is to take place bnbšy (l. 11). Pardee 
translates “in (proximity to) my soul”, but this should rather be rendered as “with regard to” 
or “for” my soul, Aramaic b here being understood as meaning “with regard to”.20 The 
inscription is thus predominantly occupied with ritual matters, ensuring the supply of the 
sacrifices needed for the eternal wellbeing of Katamuwa’s nbš. 
Let us now turn to the ritual context and the ritual actions and their significance. How did the 
ritual actually work, and how was it conceptualized? Is sacrifice for Katumuwa’s nbš a case 
of “feeding the dead”,21 or is the “soul” present at the ritual without partaking in the eating? 
If my interpretation of the use of the preposition b is correct, the soul was indeed thought to 
be fed the sacrifice. And there was nothing new to the concept of a nbš being fed; this 
practice was well known in the North-West Semitic world, as we shall see in a moment. 
                                                 
19 Pardee, “The Katumuwa Inscription”, p. 46. 
20 Cf. E. Vogt, Lexicon linguae Aramaicae Veteris Testamenti documentis antiquis 
illustratum, second edition (Rome,1994), p. 24: de, quod attinet ad. 
21 M. Suriano, “Breaking Bread with the Dead: Katumuwa’s Stele, Hosea 9:4, and the Early 
History of the Soul”, Journal of the American Oriental Society 134 (2014), (pp. 
385-405) p. 387. 
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What does the image on the stele tell us? The interdepence of the inscription and the image 
must be taken seriously.22 As we heard, Katumuwa’s nbš is described as being present in 
(Aramaic b) the stele, which ties in with the stele’s iconography. As pointed out by Bonatz, 
the Katumuwa stele is one of those stelae which “bear inscriptions […] that confirm that the 
main figure […] represents the deceased. As in the case of the Katumuwa Stele, the basic 
concept is that of a male or female person seated alone at the feasting table […]. The visual 
focus is on the table, emphasized by food and drink laid on it near the cup in the hand of the 
seated figure.”23 Katumuwa is enjoying a drink – probably wine, as mentioned in l. 9 – from 
the phiale which he holds in his right hand; food is on the table. If we try to understand what 
the image tries to convey to its beholder, the foodstuffs and drink are important. In his 
analysis, Bonatz writes: “The various types of food and drink offered to Katumuwa can in 
fact be seen as representing a source of continuous life and regeneration after death. He 
                                                 
22 Cf. I. J. Winter, “Royal Rhetoric and the Development of Historical Narrative in Neo-
Assyrian Reliefs”, Studies in Visual Communication 7 (1981), pp. 2-38, a foundational study 
of the relation between text and image on ancient Near Eastern monuments in their spatial 
context. 
23 D. Bonatz, “Katumuwa’s Banquet Scene”, in: V. R. Herrmann and J. D. Schloen (eds.), In 
Remembrance of me: Feasting with the Dead in the Ancient Middle East (Oriental Institute 
Museum Publications 37; Chicago, 2014), (pp. 39-44) pp. 42-43. On Bonatz’s view – before 
the Katumuwa stele was discovered – of the development of funerary monuments in Anatolia 
and Syria cf. idem, Das syro-hethitische Grabdenkmal: Untersuchungen zur Entstehung einer 
neuen Bildgattung in der Eisenzeit im nordsyrisch-südostanatolischen Raum (Mainz, 2000). 
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enjoys a quantity of bread, a portion of meat, and probably some sort of spices or aromatics 
kept in a luxury stone or ivory pyxis.”24  
It is quite fascinating that the Katumuwa inscription can be linked with other Aramaic 
inscriptions,25 inscriptions that have been known for a long time and were edited and 
commented on in Kanaanäische und aramäische Inschriften. The most important ones for 
our purposes are found in KAI 214 and 215. KAI 214 is an inscription dedicated by King 
Panamuwa I., whereas KAI 215 was dedicated by Panamuwa II. In 214, line 17 we read (the 
text is partly damaged), in the translation supplied in KAI: “[.]. und spricht: “Möge die Seele 
des Panammuwa mit dir [es]sen, und möge die [S]eele des Panammuwa mit dir trin[ken”]”. 
This constitutes clear support for our earlier interpretation of line 11 of the Katumuwa stele. 
In the last four lines of the Katumuwa inscription, the expressions “for my soul” and “for me” 
are clearly used in parallel: Katumuwa, as the donor of the inscription, thus takes for granted 
that the nbš encapsulates the whole of his person. That ties in with the activities of the nbš 
described in KAI 214 and KAI 215. This observation alone should advise against interpreting 
nbš simply as “life”, “vitality” or the like. And the nbš is clearly Katumuwa’s nbš, it is tied to 
his name, as Matthew Suriano rightly points out.26 
Summing up, we can conclude that the Katumuwa stele seems to combine the functions of a 
house for the nbš and an altar and that the nbš is conceptualised as an entity that equates the 
                                                 
24 Bonatz, “Katumuwa’s Banquet Scene”, p. 39. 
25 Cf. the discussion in R. C. Steiner, Disembodied Souls: The Nefesh in Israel and Kindred 
Spirits in the Ancient Near East, with an Appendix on the Katumuwa Inscription (SBL 
Ancient Near East Monographs 11; Atlanta, 2015), pp. 10-22 (chapter 1: “A Disembodied 
 .(”at Samal and Its Ancient Near Eastern Kinfolk נבש
26 Suriano, “Breaking Bread”, p. 390. 
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whole of the personality of Katumuwa, has continued to be alive and active beyond the point 
of his physical death, and now inhabits his stele.  
 
2. Are biblical texts that employ the term nefeš, and are other ancient Near Eastern texts 
and artefacts that do, similar to and possibly  influenced by concepts that are cognate 
with the concept of nbš informing the Katumuwa stele?  
There is a multitude of biblical uses of nefeš, most of which are discussed in a wide-ranging 
essay by B. Janowski.27 For the purposes of the present investigation, I will concentrate on 
some uses of nefeš in a number of biblical texts that may – at first sight – not lend themselves 
to a comparison with the Katumuwa stele. I am not going to address Ezekiel 13:18, a 
fascinating text that is most likely informed by a particularly interesting conceptualisation of 
the soul. Yet it is not directly relevant to my argument, and it has been interpreted admirably 
by Richard C. Steiner in his remarkable study Disembodied Souls.28  
                                                 
27 Janowski, “Die lebendige næfæš”, passim. 
28 The central part of Steiner, Disembodied Souls, focuses on Ezekiel 13:17-21 (pp. 23-67); 
attention is paid to Genesis 35 (pp. 3, 63, 69, 71-72, 94, 96, 101–101, 125; under the general 
heading of “Disembodied נפשות Elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible”, pp. 68-80), but not to the 
reconstruction of the sources of Genesis 35 and the implications a source analysis has for the 
interpretation of the crucial passages. Steiner does not really discuss Psalm 16, but cf. the 




First of all, I would like to draw the reader’s attention to Genesis 35. The text has a complex 
literary history, of which more in a moment. In Genesis 35 we find, amongst other things, the 
narrative of the death of Rachel. It is described in the following terms, in. v. 18: 
ין׃ ָֽ ְניָׁמִּ ֹו בִּ א־לָ֥ רָׁ ָֽ יו קָׁ ֖ בִּ י ְואָׁ ִ֑ ן־אֹונִּ א ְש֖מֹו בֶּ ָ֥ ְקרָׁ ה ַותִּ תָׁ י מ ֵ֔ ִּ֣ הּ֙ כִּ את ַנְפשָׁ ֵ֤ י ְבצ   18 ַוְיהִִּ֞
In the translation of the RSV: “And as her soul was departing (for she died), she called his 
name Ben-o′ni; but his father called his name Benjamin.” 
After Rachel’s burial Jacob acts as follows (v. 20): 
ֹום׃ ל ַעד־ַהיָֽ ֖ ח  ת־רָׁ ת ְקֻבַרָֽ בֶּ ָ֥ וא ַמצֶּ ֹ֛ ה הִּ ִ֑ תָׁ ה ַעל־ְקֻברָׁ ֖ בָׁ ב ַמצ  ב ַיֲעק ֹ֛ ֵּ֧  20 ַוַיצ 
The RSV translates: “and Jacob set up a pillar upon her grave; it is the pillar of Rachel’s 
tomb, which is there to this day”. 
While the text of Genesis 35 in its present form does not say explicitly that the maṣṣēbā 
which Jacob puts up for Rachel houses her nefeš, the conclusion that this is actually taken for 
granted by the author can be inferred on the basis of the following considerations.29 It is clear 
                                                 
29 On maṣṣēbōth, cf. J. Wellhausen, Reste arabischen Heidentums, second edition (Berlin, 
1897), pp. 101-102; Smith, Lectures on the Religion of the Semites: The Fundamental 
Institutions, ed. S. A. Cook, third edition (New York and London, 1927), pp. 203-212; Z. 
Zevit, The Religions of Ancient Israel: A Synthesis of Parallactic Approaches (London and 
New York, 2001), pp. 256-265. The conceptualization of certain types of stones as dwellings 
of the souls of the departed seems to be a Northwest-Semitic speciality. Unlike Babylonian 
images of humans and deities, the stones are not considered to be “fractals of reality” (Z. 
Bahrani, The Graven Image: Representation in Babylonia and Assyria (Archaeology, Culture 
and Society; Philadelphia, 2003), p. 132) that are as “real” as the actual divine or human 
person to which they pertain and which, in modern terminology, they “signify”. Rather, the 
stone is thought to house the soul, as we are demonstrating here with regard to Genesis 35. 
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from Gen. 35:14 that a maṣṣēbā invites libation and anointment: Jacob provides both for the 
maṣṣēbā which he erects in the place where he had his encounter with God. In fact, the 
maṣṣēbā of Gen. 35:14 is likely to have been erected for Deborah, who, we have been told in 
v. 8, just died: 
ּות׃ ֹון בָׁ כָֽ א ְש֖מֹו ַאלָ֥ ָ֥ ְקרָׁ ֹון ַויִּ ַאלִ֑ ָֽ ַחת הָׁ ל ַתִּ֣ ֖ ית־א  ָֽ ַחת ְלב  ַתָ֥ ר מִּ ֹ֛ ב  קָׁ ה ַותִּ ְבקֵָׁ֔ ת רִּ ִֶּ֣֣קֶּ ינֶּ הּ֙ מ  רָׁ ת ְדב  מָׁ ֵ֤   ַותָׁ
“And Deb′orah, Rebekah’s nurse, died, and she was buried under an oak below Bethel; so the 
name of it was called Al′lon-bacuth.” (RSV) 
As Joel Baden, deepening observations made by the classic proponents of the Documentary 
Hypothesis, has demonstrated,30 vv. 1-8.14.16b-18.20 are parts of the Elohistic source, 
whereas Vv. 9-13.15-16a.19 are Priestly.31 This is Baden’s reconstruction of the Elohistic 
material in Gen. 35:1-20: 
 
God said to Jacob, “Arise, go up to Bethel and remain there; and build an altar there to the 
God who appeared to you when you were fleeing from your brother Esau.” 2So Jacob said to 
his household and to all who were with him, “Rid yourselves of the alien gods in your midst, 
purify yourselves, and change your clothes. 3Come, let us go up to Bethel, and I will build an 
altar there to the God who answered me when I was in distress and who has been with me 
wherever I have gone.” 4They gave to Jacob all the alien gods that they had, and the rings that 
were in their ears; and Jacob buried them under the terebinth that was near Shechem. 5As 
they set out, a terror from God fell on the cities round about, so that they did not pursue the 
sons of Jacob. 6Thus Jacob came to Luz – that is, Bethel – in the land of Canaan, he and all 
the people who were with him. 7There he built an altar and named the site El-bethel, for it 
was there that God had revealed Himself to him when he was fleeing from his brother. 
8Deborah, Rebekah’s nurse, died, and was buried under the oak below Bethel; so it was 
named Allon-bacuth. 14Jacob set up a pillar, a pillar of stone, and he offered a libation on it 
and poured oil on it. 16Rachel was in childbirth, and she had hard labor. 17When her labor was 
at its hardest, the midwife said to her, “Have no fear, for it is another boy for you.” 18But as 
she breathed her last – for she was dying – she named him name Ben-oni; but his father 
                                                 
30 J. S. Baden, The Composition of the Pentateuch: Renewing the Documentary Hypothesis 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2012). 
31 Baden, Composition, pp. 233-237. Cf. J. Wellhausen, Die Composition des Hexateuchs und 
der historischen Bücher des Alten Testaments, second impression (Berlin, 1889), pp. 47-50. 
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called him Benjamin. 20Over her grave Jacob set up a pillar; it is the pillar at Rachel’s grave 
to this day.32  
 
The sequence of actions related to the maṣṣēbōth is of central importance, and their original 
purpose suddenly becomes clear. Let us have closer look at vv. 16-19: Rachel dies – in the 
words of v. 18: her nefeš proceeded – literally: went out – from her (the verb used is yṣ’). 
Once again Jacob puts up a maṣṣēbā, this one he places “on her grave”: a maṣṣēbā which is 
referred to “to this day”, the text says, as the “maṣṣēbā of the grave of Rachel” (v. 20). Baden 
translates the beginning of v. 18 as “But as she breathed her last” and thus overlooks a key 
characteristic of the Elohistic narrative he has reconstructed, i.e., the fact that it stresses the 
departure of the nefeš from the body: “And when her nefeš was departing ָׁשּה את ַנפְּ צ   because ,בְּ
she was dying” (v. 18). And it is precisely because the nefeš departs from the body that it can 
move into a maṣṣēbā – which is one of the central concerns of the Elohistic narrative in this 
section: the care for the living nefašoth of the deceased. We are not told about Jacob pouring 
libations on Rachel’s maṣṣēbā and anointing it, but we are implicitly encouraged to assume 
that he did, since he did precisely that, according to Gen. 35:14, on Deborah’s maṣṣēbā. Also, 
we are not explicitly told that Rachel’s nefeš, after having proceeded from her body, entered 
the maṣṣēbā that Jacob put up for her.  
It is highly probable that what we have here is essentially the same practice as that of the 
sacrificial offering for Katumuwa. This can be concluded for the following reasons: on the 
basis of the parallel events and actions narrated in vv. 8 and 14, on the one hand, and vv. 14 
and 20, on the other, it is safe to assume that they illuminate each other and that Rachel’s 
maṣṣēbā is assumed to receive the same treatment as Deborah’s, i.e., is used for libations. 
The libations in v. 14 and (implicitly) in v. 20 would be pointless without 
someone/something the libation is supposed to benefit. The object of the libation can, 
                                                 
32 Baden, Composition, pp. 239-240. 
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according to the context, only be the nefeš which has left the body. The maṣṣēbā of v. 14 is 
assumed to contain Deborah’s nefeš, and that of v. 20 to house Rachel’s nefeš: the Katumuwa 
inscription provides the key to understanding where the nefeš is supposed to go, i.e., from the 
body into the maṣṣēbā.  
It is not necessary to postulate a direct influence of Northern Syrian concepts of the nbš on 
the understanding of nefeš in the Southern Levant. Z. Zevit has shown how widespread the 
use of maṣṣēbōth was across the whole area in question, from the Negev to Phoenicia and 
northern Syria, and he has pointed out the close similarities between the standing stones, their 
uses, and the terminologies used to designate them across a number of Semitic cultures and 
languages.33 The Katumuwa inscription gives us the key to viewing the biblical evidence 
synoptically in the context of the evidence of standing stones across the various Semitic 
cultures in the area. It allows to conclude that, in pre-exilic Israel and Judah, maṣṣēbōth were 
understood to house the deceased persons’ nefašoth and thus give the deceased persons’ 
relatives the opportunity to visit and feed them. This conclusion is supported by other texts 
and by archaeological finds which indicate that libations and ointments applied to such 
standing stones were sacrifices for the persons of the deceased. They were thought to live on 
in some way in the standing stone, or else such sacrifices would have made no sense.  
Let us now turn to Psalm 16. There are those who think of it as an early, so-called 
“Canaanite” psalm, and others who date it to the third century. The key verses for the 
purposes of this investigation are vv. 10 and 11: 
ַחת 10 ֹות ָׁשֽ אִ֥ רְּ ךָ֗ ל  ידְּ ס  ן ֲחֲ֝ ִ֥ ת  א־ת  ֹֽ ֹול ל אֵ֑ ׁשְּ י ל  ִ֣ ׁש  ב ַנפְּ י לֹא־ַתֲעֹזִ֣ ֵ֤  ׃כ 
                                                 
33 Z. Zevit, The Religions of Ancient Israel: A Synthesis of Parallactic Approaches, London: 
Continuum, 2001, pp. 256-262. 
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ַצח 11 ךִ֣ ֶנֽ ינְּ ימ  ֹות ב  מֵ֖ ע  ָמחֹות ֶאת־ָפֶנֵ֑יך נְּ ַבע שְְּׂ֭ ים ֹשִ֣ ִ֥ י  ַרח ַחַ֫ ֮י ֹאֵ֤ נ  יע   ׃ֽת ֹוד 
The RSV translates:  
10 For thou dost not give me up to Sheol, 
or let thy godly one see the Pit. 
11 Thou dost show me the path of life; in thy presence there is fulness of joy, in thy right 
hand are pleasures for evermore. 
It thus circumvents the problem posed by the use of nefeš. Other translations are less evasive; 
cf. the KJV’s rendering of v. 10: “For thou wilt not leave my soul in hell; neither wilt thou 
suffer thine Holy One to see corruption.” The two translations exemplify the two main 
strands of interpretation: V. 10 is typically interpreted either as a reference to the supplicant’s 
soul, life, or person being saved from the netherworld after the point of physical death or as 
an indication of the preservation of the supplicant’s life from dangers encountered in their 
earthly existence.34 It should be noted that neither “thy godly one” nor “thine Holy One” is a 
good translation of  ָ֗ך ידְּ ס   .your devout one” or “faithful one” would be more appropriate“ ;ֲחֲ֝
Let us have a closer look at the verses. In v. 10, nafši is used, in v. 11 the 1st ps. pers. suff. is 
added to a form of yd‘: the author thus clearly distinguishes between the use of nefeš and the 
standard use of suffixes to refer to agents in the text. Therefore translating the crucial 
segment of v. 10 as “thou dost not give me up” is inadequate. That is confirmed by the fact 
that nafši and  ָ֗ך ידְּ ס   are in parallel: the nefeš is equated with the devout/faithful person. With ֲחֲ֝
regard to what will or will not happen to the nefeš, the psalmist states that God will not 
                                                 
34 On the remarkable variety of interpretations, see K. Liess, Der Weg des Lebens: Psalm 16 
und das Lebens- und Todesverständnis der Individualpsalmen (FAT II/5; Tübingen, 2004), 
pp. 3-30.  
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abandon it, will not leave it to Sheol. The verb ‘zb is used, in parallel with yr’: just as much 
as the nefeš of the psalmist will not be abandoned, the faithful one – i.e., the psalmist – will 
not see ַחת  that is, corruption, decomposition. The root š–ḥ–t refers to actual corruption ,ָׁשֽ
(amongst Phoenician inscriptions, cf. KAI 24:15.16; amongst inscriptions in Aramaic, cf. šḥt2 
in KAI 215:2.7). To use it to refer to the burial pit means using it metonymically. The 
consequences of God’s action are spelled out in v. 11: the faithful person will see the “path of 
life” and will experience the “fullness of joy” and eternal pleasures in the presence of the 
deity. The psalmist thus paints a picture of eschatological salvation for the individual who 
will forever be in the presence of the divine: v. 11 explicates v. 10 and illuminates the future 
state of the faithful person’s nefeš – the nefeš, which is thought to encapsulate the whole 
person, is here viewed as being capable of eternal existence. The only adequate translation of 
nefeš, in this verse, is “soul”35 – the nefeš is in parallel with  ָ֗ך ידְּ ס   and is thus seen as a ֲחֲ֝
personal force, as agent orientated towards the deity’s salvation, which lies in the future, as is 
clarified by the context generally and the use of the verbs in particular. 
Let us also cast an eye on Psalm 49:15-16: There is a contrast between the godless whose 
form (ṣyr*4 “form” (in the sense of Gestalt), “image”) “shall waste away in Sheol” (NJPS) 
and the nefeš of the psalmist which God will redeem from the “clutches of Sheol”. The 
                                                 
35 Cf. H. Gese, “Der Tod im Alten Testament”, in idem, Zur biblischen Theologie: 
Alttestamentliche Vorträge (BevTh 78; Munich, 1977), (pp. 31-54) p. 47: “Denn du (Gott) 
überläßt meine Seele […] nicht dem Hades, / läßt nicht zu, daß dein Vertrauter die Grube 
sieht”. 
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redeeming, or taking away from, is expressed through the same verb lqḥ that we find applied 
to Enoch (Gen. 5:24) and Elijah (2 Kings 2) when they are taken up into heaven.36 
 
3. The Katumuwa stele and the conceptualization of nefeš in the Hebrew Bible 
 
Let us now summarize and interpret the evidence we have adduced. I should like to start with 
a longish quotation. I have chosen it because it is characteristic of a certain trend of 
interpreting the biblical and related evidence. Seth Sanders summarizes his views on nefeš 
and states that  
 
neither in Sam’alian nor in the 756 instances of the cognate nefeš in the Hebrew Bible does it 
ever clearly appear in disembodied form, apart from a physical object (always human in the 
Bible, a stele at Zincirli). After death, the Biblical Hebrew nefeš has no separate existence; 
when it departs, it ceases to exist and, like the Ugaritic nps, “goes out (yṣ’) like a light.” In 
Priestly literature, it denotes the ritually significant aspect of a recently dead corpse. At 
Sam'al, the only attested postmortem role for the nbš is to eat, a role paralleled by its 
prominent biblical role as the seat of the appetites, crystallized in expressions such as 'awwat 
+ nefeš “craving,” for meat in Dt 12:15, 20 and 1 Sam 2:16.37 
 
Having examined the Katamuwa inscription and some of the biblical key texts, we can safely 
state now that Sanders’s conclusion constitutes a misinterpretation of the evidence. Rather, 
texts like Genesis 35, Ezekiel 18, and Psalms 16, 42 and 49 demonstrate that blanket 
statements on the biblical use of nefeš, like the one just adduced, result from isolating biblical 
instances of the use of nefeš from their immediate literary contexts and their cultural and 
                                                 
36 Thus Gese, “Tod”, p. 45. With regard to the nefeš being in Sheol and about to be delivered 
from the nether world, also cf. Psalms 16:10, 30:4, 49:16, 86:13, 89:49, Proverbs 23:14; and 
Isa. 38:17, Job 33:18, 22, 28, 30. 
37 Sanders, “The Appetites of the Dead”, p. 44. 
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religious settings. In the case of Genesis 35, for example, Sanders overlooks the significance 
of yṣ’ and becomes the victim of his own translation: yṣ’ does mean “to go out”, but not like a 
light – it means “to go out” in the sense of “to leave”, “to proceed from”, as in a number of 
Ugaritic texts, for example in the context of the murder of Aqhat, CTA/KTU 1.18 IV, when it 
is stated that his soul left the body, using the Ugaritic cognates of nefeš and yṣ’. That is why 
an expression like nefeš mēt in Num. 6:6 and Lev. 21:11, referring to the soul of a dead 
person, is possible in the first place: because the underlying notion is that the nefeš has left 
the (now dead) body.38 
As we have seen, in pre-exilic Israel and Judah maṣṣēbōth were conceptualised as houses of 
the nefašoth of human beings and as altars for their service, including the cases of Jacob’s 
anointing of and libation for the maṣṣēbā of Deborah and of the maṣṣēbā of Rachel in 
Genesis 35. KAI 214 and 215 and, strikingly, the Katumuwa stele are witnesses to the same 
practices, only in a more elaborate form. Both the maṣṣēbōth in Genesis 35 and the 
Katumuwa stele were thought to house the nefeš of departed persons. In this respect the 
Katumuwa stele – called a nṣb in its inscription, the Aramaic cognate of Hebrew maṣṣēbā – 
very much resembles the maṣṣēbōth known from the Bible and through archaeological 
excavations, which also combine the two functions.  
At least since the days of William Robertson Smith and Julius Wellhausen, there has been a 
debate, on and off, about the purpose of the maṣṣēbōth mentioned in the Hebrew Bible. Until 
very recent times, not that much progress had been made with regard to finding a definitive 
answer. In his work The Religions of Ancient Israel, with its extremely thorough discussion 
of cult places and objects, and especially of maṣṣēbōth, Ziony Zevit concludes with regard to 
                                                 
38 K. Elliger, Leviticus (Handbuch zum Alten Testament I/4; Tübingen, 1966), p. 288, also cf. 
ibid., n. 1. 
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maṣṣēbōth that they “were aniconic representations of the deity [i.e., Yhwh] whose function 
was to guarantee its presence when addressed”.39 Others stress the connection with burial, but 
see maṣṣēbōth simply as “grave-markers”.40 On the basis of our exploration of the biblical 
texts in conjunction with the Katamuwa inscription and stele, we can now conclude that 
maṣṣēbōth typically were neither of the two. They housed the nefašoth of the deceased in 
order for them to be fed and thus properly looked after in their post-mortem existence. The 
fact that mortuary steles can be called nefašoth is explained by the belief that the soul enters 
its new “house” and the latter then becomes identified with the former. Georg Beer held that 
view, and published it, in 1921, but his conclusions were speculative and did not have much 
non-biblical evidence to support it.41 On the basis of the Katumuwa find, seen in conjunction 
with other Aramaic inscriptions and the biblical texts, especially the Elohistic material in 
Genesis 35, we can now confidently state that one of the main purposes of maṣṣēbōth – 
maybe the main purpose – was to ensure the continued existence of the soul of the deceased 
person and its presence both amongst the living and simultaneously in the presence of the 
                                                 
39 Zevit, Religions of Ancient Israel, p. 261. 
40 E. Bloch-Smith, Judahite Burial Practices and Beliefs About the Dead (JSOTSup 123; 
Sheffield, 1992), p. 113 and T. J. Lewis, “How Far Can Texts Take Us? Evaluating Textual 
Sources for Reconstructing Ancient Israelite Beliefs about the Dead”, in B. M. Gittlen (ed.), 
Sacred Time, Sacred Place: Archaeology and the Religion of Israel (Winona Lake, Ind., 
2002), pp. 169-217. 
41 G. Beer, Steinverehrung bei den Israeliten: Ein Beitrag zur semitischen und allgemeinen 
Religionsgeschichte (Berlin and Leipzig, 1921). 
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deity.42 This confirms that in ancient Israel the same notion existed as that found in Western 
Anatolian funerary monuments, of which Craig Melchert says “that the notion of the soul 
residing in the funeral stele is a result of the cultural synthesis that took place in the Syrian-
Anatolian contact zone”.43 
                                                 
42 Beer, Steinverehrung, p. 11: “Als der Mensch in sich die Seele entdeckte, hat er die 
Steinidole, ebenso wie er mit anderen heiligen Naturmalen verfuhr, mit einer Seele 
ausgestattet und in ihnen die Behausungen eines Einzelwesens gesehen. Da das Heilige, das 
in dem Stein verkörpert ist, das Wesen aller Dämonen, Geister und Götter bildet, kann 
schließlich der Stein Symbol und Abbild jeder Gottheit sein, so wie der Grabstein das 
Duplikat der einzelnen Totenseelen ist. Mit dem Kultstein deckt sich auf arabisch-
israelitischem Gebiet die älteste Gestalt des Altars. Dann ist aber auch der altisraelitische 
Altar ursprünglich ein Idol oder Fetisch: das Ebenbild der präsenten Gottheit. Erst in einem 
weiteren Entwickelungsstadium ist der israelitische Altar Gabetisch, Feuerherd und 
Räucherstätte geworden.” 
43 H. C. Melchert, “Remarks on the Kuttamuwa Inscription”, Kubaba 1 (2010), (pp. 4-11) p. 
9: “The reference in the Kuttamuwa inscription to a soul independent of the body is thus no 
novelty in Anatolia. As already indicated by David Schloen, the exciting genuinely new 
contribution of the text is the explicit statement that the soul of the deceased resides in the 
funeral stele, which offers confirmation of what has previously only been suspected. See the 
very cautious claim of Hutter (1993: 104) and also Watkins (2008: 136-9) on the common 
word for both ‘funerary monument’ and ‘cult stele’ in the western Anatolian Indo-European 
languages: HLuvian tasa(n)-za, Lycian θθẽ, Lydian tasẽν, etymologically *‘possessing the 
sacred/divine’. As stressed by Hutter (1993: 103-4), it is striking that the Hittite word 
NA
4ḫuwaši- is used only to refer to cult steles believed to contain a deity and to boundary 
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Different biblical authors had different concepts of the nature and significance of the human 
nefeš, but, as we have seen, to understand it as “soul” or “(essence of the) person” was clearly 
one of them. In fact, the views of some biblical authors and redactors, like those expressed by 
the Elohist in Genesis 35, were virtually identical with those held by Katumuwa. Those of 
others were not: to name just one possibility, nefeš could be conceived of as simply 
indicating the vital force, desire, appetite, cf. Deut. 12:20-21, Jer. 2:24, Prov. 28:25. This 
divergence of views within the same literary collection is not surprising. Not only do we have 
a huge range of meanings of nefeš in the Hebrew Bible, we also find that the 
conceptualizations of nefeš as soul or person are not uniform. Furthermore, they do not seem 
to follow any developmental pattern. But one thing is for sure: they existed, and they were 
expressed ritually. We can reconstruct the practice of feeding the souls or personal essences 
of individuals after those individuals’ physical deaths. This conceptualization of an 
individual’s nefeš and its post mortem existence and presence was an important part of the 
Israelites’ view of the human condition, at least up to the seventh century, when the 
                                                 
markers, never to funerary monuments (for a summary of uses see Puhvel 1991: 438-40). 
Since an Indo-European inheritance for the western Anatolian usage seems unlikely, one 
should rather consider that the notion of the soul residing in the funeral stele is a result of the 
cultural synthesis that took place in the Syrian-Anatolian contact zone (see already Hutter 
1993: 105-6).” The reference to ‘Hutter 1993’ is to M. Hutter, “Kultstelen und Baityloi: Die 
Ausstrahlung eines syrischen religiösen Phänomens nach Kleinasien und Israel”, in B. 
Janowski et al. (eds.), Religionsgeschichtliche Beziehungen zwischen Kleinasien, Nordsyrien, 
und dem Alten Testament (Göttingen, 1993), pp. 87-108. 
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Deuteronomistic movement44 tried to suppress certain funerary rituals and the beliefs that 
provided their basis. This meant that concepts which implied some form of continued 
existence of the dead now came under the scrutiny of the propagators of the supposed 
purification of the Yahwistic religion, a purification that was in fact the consequence of new 
economic and social constellations in Judah,45 as discussed by J. Blenkinsopp.46 The belief in 
the nefeš as soul or personal essence provided that basis, and that is why the Pentateuch 
redaction tried to obfuscate its traces. Funerary cults are targeted by both the 
Deuteronom(ist)ic movement and the Priestly School (Num. 19:11-16; Num. 31:19) as well 
as the Holiness School (cf. Lev 21:6), probably for the reasons given by Blenkinsopp in his 
application of Max Weber’s insights. Both the Deuteronomic-Deuteronomistic view (cf. 
                                                 
44 Cf. W. Groß (ed.), Jeremia und die deuteronomistische Bewegung (BBB 98; Weinheim, 
1995), pp. 87-108. 
45 The same tendency can be detected in Trito-Isaiah; as Suriano, “Breaking Bread”, p. 404, 
n. 95 rightly points out with regard to “the prophet” Trito-Isaiah: “Thus, the prophet was 
rejecting the foundations of the traditional kinship-based society.” 
46 J. Blenkinsopp, “Deuteronomy and the Politics of Post-Mortem Existence”, VT 45 (1995), 
pp. 1–16, on the eradication of cults of the dead in Judah from the late pre-exilic period 
onwards is relevant here. Cf. Blenkinsopp on Dtn 12-26*: “Since ancestor cult was an 
essential integrative element of a social system based on lineage, it was opposed in the name 
of a centralized state cult which claimed the exclusive allegiance of those living within the 
confines of the state. The laws concerning death rites and forbidding commerce with the dead 
in Deuteronomy were therefore part of a broader strategy of undermining the lineage system 
to which the individual household (bêt ‘āb) belonged.”46 
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Deut. 26;14), possibly foreshadowed in Hos 9:1-4,47 and the Priestly views of the matter 
deeply influenced the work of redactors who worked on texts that betrayed older notions of 
nefeš as soul or person, as in the case of Genesis 35, where the traces of the archaic concept 
of the nefeš in the maṣṣēbā was skilfully transformed into the notion of the maṣṣēbā as a 
memorial of God’s presence. 
The fact that we only have a few instances in the Hebrew Bible which clearly point to the 
concept of a soul must have to do with the marginalisation and attempted eradication of any 
ritualized action for the benefit of the dead. The conceptualization of nefeš as soul was 
suppressed because it was a constant reminder of the existence and attraction of traditional 
cults of pre-Israelite origin employing maṣṣēbōth and other objects that now seemed 
unacceptable. 
That many contemporary scholars cannot see that nefeš was conceptualized as soul – or, if 
preferred, essence of the person – during the pre-exilic period, is due to a number of 
intellectual constellations. The two most important ones are, in my view, (1) the weight of 
Deuteronomistic ideology in the biblical tradition and (2) a certain perception of what is 
intellectually responsible exegesis today. The former constellation dominates much of the 
biblical tradition and continues to dominate and prejudice the minds of many present-day 
exegetes when they go about their work, thus affecting their historical-philological work. The 
latter constellation leads to statements such as the following. Matthew Suriano writes in his 
very thorough study of the Katumuwa stele , when discussing its ritual use and location: 
“Within these performative frameworks, the ֶפׁש  becomes [!!] an object of selfhood that  ֶנֶ֫
transcends death.”48 Also, he says: “The rituals that occur inside this space reify Katumuwa’s 
                                                 
47 Cf. Suriano, “Breaking Bread”. 
48 Suriano, “Breaking Bread”, p. 393. 
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self; that is, the act of feeding objectifies his defunct-soul within a specialized location.”49 So 
Suriano concludes that while the Katumuwa inscription clearly speaks of the nefeš as a living 
entity present in the standing stone, and while nefeš should be translated as “soul”, the soul 
was nevertheless conceptualized as becoming (instead of being!) “an object of selfhood” and 
that the feeding “objectifies” the soul in a certain location. We have here an interpretation of 
the evidence which is, in my view, dominated by the sense that, after the collapse of its 
metaphysical foundations in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, it no longer 
makes sense to speak of the soul as a distinct, permanent entity. Some exegetes seem to 
project that view onto ancient texts that are governed by the belief in a soul and relativize that 
belief: the soul “becomes” an “object of selfhood” where quite clearly the ancient text takes 
for granted that nefeš does not become, but is a permanent, distinct entity that is 
distinguishable from the body, inhabits the body, in some way encapsulates and expresses 
personhood, and leaves the body at the point of the person’s physical death. The fact that this 
is so hard to grasp for contemporary Hebrew Bible scholarship is due to the lasting effect of a 
certain understanding of the Kantian criticism of traditional concepts of the soul that we have 
all imbibed.50 While, generally speaking, the insights, achievements and methods developed 
by the Enlightenment and the new approach to history which it triggered are the basis of 
everything we do, we must not let its philosophical notions stand in the way of exegetical 
                                                 
49 Suriano, “Breaking Bread”, p. 396. 
50 Barth, “Selbstbewußtsein und Seele”, p. 201: “Kant ist der eigentliche Urheber des für die 
Moderne signifikanten Wandels vom Substanzdenken zum Funktionsdenken.” That had a 
massive effect on all later conceptualizations of the soul and also adversely affected 
reconstructions of historical conceptualizations of the soul, as Barth demonstrates in his 
essay. 
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attempts to uncover the meaning of ancient texts and artefacts. As we have seen, a self-
reflexive comparativist approach to the study of North-West Semitic religious practices, 
combined with a fresh analysis of the relevant texts and artefacts, can advance the 
understanding of a key concept of ancient Israelite religion that permeates much of biblical 
literature.51 
 
                                                 
51 And if one extends the enquiry beyond the Hebrew Bible and into Jewish Hellenistic 
literature, including Jewish Hellenistic works that have traditionally been valued as scripture 
by the Christian Church, it becomes even more obvious what range of views of the nature of 
the soul existed: suffice it to mention the quasi-Stoic view of the soul, ψυχή, as an entity 
composed of ἄφθαρτον (incorruptible) πνεύμα, i.e., of matter (!), in the Wisdom of Solomon, 
as opposed to the Platonic view of the soul as non-material. In a sense, things come full circle 
in the Wisdom of Solomon: it is informed by a view of the soul as being material, as in 
Genesis 35 and the Katumuwa inscription, but for very different reasons and on the basis of a 
very different tradition. 
